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In this short note, I give an elementary proof of a key result in Ben-Porath, Dekel,
and Lipman (2014), henceforth referred to as BDL.
I first state the key assumptions. We have independent random variables, t1, . . . , tI .
The support of ti, Ti, is a subset of the interval [ti, t¯i] where we assume−∞ < ti < t¯i <∞.
The cdf of ti is denoted Fi and we assume it has a density fi. We assume Fi(0) < 1 for
at least one i — otherwise, the analysis is trivial.
We have exogenously given scalars, ϕ1, . . . , ϕI where
∑
i ϕi ≤ 1 and ϕi ≥ 0 for all i.
A mechanism is a profile of functions p = (p1, . . . , pI) such that pi : T → [0, 1] and∑
i pi(t) ≤ 1 for all t. The principal’s problem1 is to choose a mechanism to maximize∑
i
Et[pi(t)ti]
subject to pˆi(ti) ≥ ϕi for all ti ∈ Ti and all i where
pˆi(ti) = Et−ipi(t).
1BDL write this problem in a different but equivalent way. They write the principal’s objective
function as
∑
i Et[pi(t)(ti − ci)] for constants ci. Our ti should be interpreted as their ti − ci.
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We say that p is a threshold mechanism if there exists t∗ ≥ 0 with the following
properties up to sets of measure zero. First, if ti < t
∗, then pˆi(ti) = ϕi. Second if t has
the property that ti > t
∗ for some i, then pj(t) = 1 for that j such that tj = maxk tk.
Third, either t∗ = 0 or
∑
i pi(t) = 1 for all t.
This is a slightly different definition than that of BDL. They do not include the third
property or the requirement that t∗ ≥ 0. On the other hand, they do prove that their
optimal threshold mechanisms satisfy these properties.
Lemma 1. A threshold mechanism exists.
Proof. First, suppose ϕi = 0 for all i. Then the mechanism that gives the good to the
agent with the highest type if this type is positive and to no agent otherwise is a threshold
mechanism with threshold 0. Henceforth, assume there exists i with ϕi > 0.
Consider the function
g(t∗) ≡ ∑
i|ϕi>0
ϕi∏
j 6=i Fj(t∗)
.
Clearly, g is continuous and decreasing. Also,
g(max
i
t¯i) =
∑
i
ϕi ≤ 1.
Suppose g(0) ≤ 1. Then consider the following mechanism. If any ti > 0, we allocate
the good to the agent with the highest type. If all ti < 0, i receives the good with prob-
ability ϕi/
∏
j 6=i Fj(0). This mechanism is clearly feasible and is a threshold mechanism
with t∗ = 0.
To be more specific, first, suppose Fj(0) > 0 for all j. Then∑
i
ϕi∏
j 6=i Fj(0)
≤ 1,
so we can allocate the good to i with probability ϕi/
∏
j 6=i Fj(0) and get a feasible alloca-
tion. Second, suppose Fj(0) = 0 for some j. Since g(0) <∞, we must have ϕi = 0 for all
j 6= i. Since there is some agent k with ϕk > 0, we must have ϕj > 0. Again, g(0) <∞
then implies Fi(0) > 0 for all i 6= j. Hence
g(0) =
ϕj∏
i 6=j Fi(0)
≤ 1.
So we can give the good to j with probability g(0) when every other agent has a type
below 0. Either way, we get a threshold mechanism with threshold 0.
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So suppose g(0) > 1. By continuity, there exists t∗ > 0 such that g(t∗) = 1. Fix such
a t∗. Define the mechanism by giving the good to the agent with the highest type for any
t such that ti > t
∗ for some i. When ti < t∗ for all i, give the good to i with probability
ϕi/
∏
j 6=i Fj(t∗). This is a threshold mechanism with threshold t∗.
Theorem 1. A mechanism is optimal if and only if it is a threshold mechanism.
Proof. First, we show that any threshold mechanism is optimal. Suppose not. Fix a
threshold mechanism p which is not optimal. Let p∗ denote a feasible mechanism with a
strictly higher payoff for the principal.
First, construct a new mechanism, p∗∗, by
p∗∗i (t) =

0, if ti > t
∗ and ∃j 6= i with tj > ti
p∗i (t), if ti < t
∗
p∗i (t) +
∑
{j|tj>t∗ and ti>tj} p
∗
j(t), otherwise.
In other words, we move all probability allocated to an agent who is above the threshold
and is not the highest type to the highest type. Clearly, p∗∗i (t) ≥ 0 for all i and all t and∑
i p
∗∗
i (t) =
∑
i p
∗
i (t) ≤ 1, so p∗∗ is a well–defined mechanism. Also, unless p∗∗(t) = p∗(t)
except on sets of measure zero, the principal strictly prefers p∗∗ to p∗.
There are two important points to note about this mechanism. First, it need not
be feasible given ϕ. That is, we may well have pˆ∗∗i (ti) < ϕi for some ti. However, this
won’t affect the argument. The point is that if there is a feasible p∗ which is strictly
better than p, then this potentially infeasible p∗∗ is also strictly better. We will derive a
contradiction to the latter, completing the proof of this part of the Theorem.
Second, for all ti > t
∗, we must have pˆ∗∗i (ti) ≤ pˆi(ti). To see this, note that under p,
any ti > t
∗ receives the good at profile t if and only if he has the highest type. Under
p∗∗, a necessary condition for such ti to receive the good is that he has the highest type,
but this might not be sufficient.
Since p∗∗ yields the principal at least as high a payoff as p∗ and p∗ yields a strictly
higher payoff than p, we have∑
i
∫ t¯i
ti
pˆ∗∗i (ti)tifi(ti) dti >
∑
i
∫ t¯i
ti
pˆi(ti)tifi(ti) dti
or ∑
i
∫ t∗
ti
[pˆ∗∗i (ti)− pˆi(ti)]tifi(ti) dti >
∑
i
∫ t¯i
t∗
[pˆi(ti)− pˆ∗∗i (ti)]tifi(ti) dti.
When t∗ > ti, we have pˆi(ti) = ϕi ≤ pˆ∗∗i (ti). Hence
t∗
∑
i
∫ t∗
ti
[pˆ∗∗i (ti)− pˆi(ti)]fi(ti) dti ≥
∑
i
∫ t∗
ti
[pˆ∗∗i (ti)− pˆi(ti)]tifi(ti) dti.
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For ti > t
∗, we have pˆi(ti) ≥ pˆ∗∗i (ti), implying
∑
i
∫ t¯i
t∗
[pˆi(ti)− pˆ∗∗i (ti)]tifi(ti) dti ≥ t∗
∑
i
∫ t¯i
t∗
[pˆi(ti)− pˆ∗∗i (ti)]fi(ti) dti
Combining these three inequalities gives
t∗
∑
i
∫ t∗
ti
[pˆ∗∗i (ti)− pˆi(ti)]fi(ti) dti ≥
∑
i
∫ t∗
ti
[pˆ∗∗i (ti)− pˆi(ti)]tifi(ti) dti
>
∑
i
∫ t¯i
t∗
[pˆi(ti)− pˆ∗∗i (ti)]tifi(ti) dti
≥ t∗∑
i
∫ t¯i
t∗
[pˆi(ti)− pˆ∗∗i (ti)]fi(ti) dti.
Recall that t∗ ≥ 0. Clearly, if t∗ = 0, this equation gives a contradiction. So t∗ > 0.
Hence ∑
i
∫ t∗
ti
[pˆ∗∗i (ti)− pˆi(ti)]fi(ti) dti >
∑
i
∫ t¯i
t∗
[pˆi(ti)− pˆ∗∗i (ti)]fi(ti) dti
or ∑
i
∫ t¯i
ti
pˆ∗∗i (ti)fi(ti) dti >
∑
i
∫ t¯i
ti
pˆi(ti)fi(ti) dti.
Rewriting, ∑
i
∫
p∗∗i (t)f(t) dt >
∑
i
∫
pi(t)f(t) dt
But recall that if t∗ > 0, we have
∑
i pi(t) = 1 for all t. Hence∫ ∑
i
p∗∗i (t)f(t) dt >
∫ ∑
i
pi(t)f(t) dt =
∫
f(t) dt = 1.
Clearly, this is impossible. Hence p must be optimal.
Next, we show that every optimal mechanism is a threshold mechanism. So let p be
a threshold mechanism with threshold t∗ and let p∗ be any other optimal mechanism.
Suppose pˆ∗i (ti) > pˆi(ti) for a positive measure set of ti > t
∗. Since under p, any
ti > t
∗ receives the object if and only if he has the highest type, this implies that there is
positive measure set of t−i such that ti receives the object even though he does not have
the highest type. But then we can improve p∗ by moving some probability from ti to the
agent with the highest type on such profiles t. Since pˆ∗i (ti) > pˆi(ti) ≥ ϕi, moving a small
enough amount of probability this way is feasible. Since this would give a mechanism
strictly better for the principal than p∗ and p∗ is optimal, we know this is impossible.
Hence, up to sets of measure zero, pˆ∗i (ti) ≤ pˆi(ti) for all ti > t∗.
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Also, we know that for ti < t
∗, pˆi(ti) = ϕi ≤ pˆ∗i (ti). Because p and p∗ are both
optimal,
∑
i
∫ t∗
ti
[pˆ∗i (ti)− pˆi(ti)]tifi(ti) dti =
∑
i
∫ t¯i
t∗
[pˆi(ti)− pˆ∗i (ti)]tifi(ti) dti.
Following similar reasoning to the first part of the proof, we see that
t∗
∑
i
∫ t∗
ti
[pˆ∗i (ti)− pˆi(ti)]fi(ti) dti ≥
∑
i
∫ t∗
ti
[pˆ∗i (ti)− pˆi(ti)]tifi(ti) dti
≥∑
i
∫ t¯i
t∗
[pˆi(ti)− pˆ∗i (ti)]tifi(ti) dti
≥ t∗∑
i
∫ t¯i
t∗
[pˆi(ti)− pˆ∗i (ti)]fi(ti) dti.
with at least one strict inequality if and only if pˆ∗i (ti) 6= pˆi(ti) on a positive measure
subset of Ti for some i. Recall that t
∗ ≥ 0. If t∗ = 0, we cannot have a strict inequality,
so either t∗ > 0 or pˆ∗i (ti) = pˆi(ti) up to a set of measure zero for all i. Assuming the
former, then, we have
∑
i
∫ t∗
ti
[pˆ∗i (ti)− pˆi(ti)]fi(ti) dti ≥
∑
i
∫ t¯i
t∗
[pˆi(ti)− pˆ∗i (ti)]fi(ti) dti
with strict inequality if and only if pˆ∗i (ti) 6= pˆi(ti) on a positive measure subset of Ti for
some i. Rewriting as in the first part of the proof, this implies∫ ∑
i
p∗i (t)f(t) dt ≥
∫ ∑
i
pi(t)f(t) dt =
∫
f(t) dt = 1,
with strict inequality iff pˆ∗i (ti) 6= pˆi(ti) on a positive measure subset of Ti for some i.
Since a strict inequality is impossible, we see that pˆ∗i (ti) = pˆi(ti) with probability 1 for
all i.
Clearly, then, up to sets of measure zero, we have pˆ∗i (ti) = ϕi for all ti < t
∗. For
ti > t
∗, suppose pˆ∗i (ti) = pˆi(ti), but that the allocation for some profiles t−i differ across
p and p∗ given ti. We know that it cannot be the case that ti receives the good when
there is a higher type since we could improve in that case. Hence ti can only get the
good when he has the highest type. But his overall probability of getting the good must
exactly equal the probability he has the highest type, so this implies that any deviations
from getting the good when he has the highest type are measure zero. Hence, p∗ is a
threshold mechanism with threshold t∗.
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